Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 54

Issue 1

Article 16

2022

Responding to Claims of Atrocities Against the Rohingya: Behind
the Scenes of the 2018 Rohingya Documentation Project
Andrew C. Mann
Nicole Carle

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrew C. Mann and Nicole Carle, Responding to Claims of Atrocities Against the Rohingya: Behind the
Scenes of the 2018 Rohingya Documentation Project, 54 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 305 (2022)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol54/iss1/16

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons.

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Vol. 54 (2022)

Responding to Claims of
Atrocities Against the Rohingya:
Behind the Scenes of the 2018
Rohingya Documentation
Project1
Andrew C. Mann*
Nicole Carle**
Table of Contents
I.

Introduction............................................................................ 306

II.

History of the Rohingya Crisis .............................................. 310

III. The 2018 Mission ...................................................................... 313
1.

See generally DANIEL J. FULLERTON, RALPH KEEFER, MILICA KOSTIC, ANNA
TRIPONEL, PAUL R. WILLIAMS & JONATHAN P. WORBOYS, DOCUMENTING
ATROCITY CRIMES COMMITTED AGAINST THE ROHINGYA IN MYANMAR’S
RAKHINE STATE: THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY GROUP’S 2018
HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION MISSION (2018) [hereinafter PILPG
Report]. The Project, its findings, legal analysis, and impact would not have
been possible without the extraordinary abilities and efforts of the Project
Director, Milica Kostic.

*

Andrew C. Mann is a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer, currently
consulting with PILPG as its Strategic Advisor. A former clerk for the U.S.
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, he spent more than thirty-five years in
government service working in nine countries. He was detailed to the U.S.
State Department’s Legal Advisor’s Office for a year and then as an Expert
on Mission to the Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia. As a State Department Pearson Fellow, he
taught international law and human rights at the Henry M. Jackson School
of International Studies, University of Washington. Later, in Afghanistan,
he worked as Deputy Coordinator for Rule of Law, preparing for the 2007
Rome Conference on Justice and Rule of Law. He was the Senior Legal
Advisor to the Rohingya Documentation Project.

**

Nicole Carle is Assistant Counsel for PILPG and has contributed to or
managed multiple ongoing documentation projects. She supports PILPG’s
transitional justice work in Yemen and Ukraine, in addition to managing
its project on the intersection of documentation and technology. She
graduated cum laude from American University Washington College of Law
and previously worked for both Senator Duckworth (IL) and the U.S. House
of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. The authors reviewed
PILPG records and interviewed Milica Kostic, Daniel Fullerton, PILPG
Program Manager for the Project, and Stephanie Munro Courtney, a
member of the PILPG on site logistics team, for this article.

305

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Vol. 54 (2022)
Responding to Claims of Atrocities Against the Rohingya:
Behind the Scenes of the 2018 Rohingya Documentation Project
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

Assembling a Team ...................................................................... 314
Methodology of Data Collection ..................................................... 315
Questionnaire .............................................................................. 316
Logistics ...................................................................................... 317
Getting to the Field ...................................................................... 317
Interpretation .............................................................................. 318
Overcoming Hurdles ..................................................................... 319
1. Visas .............................................................................................. 320
2. Work Demands .............................................................................. 320
3. Movement Within the Camps ....................................................... 322
4. Money ............................................................................................ 323
5. Methodology: Beautiful in the Abstract, but Challenging in
Implementation ............................................................................ 323
6. Mapping ........................................................................................ 324
7. Coding and Analysis...................................................................... 325

IV. Writing the Report ................................................................ 326
V.

Conclusion ............................................................................... 328

I.
–

Introduction

“They were hunting us.”
A 50-year-old Rohingya woman from Maungdaw2

“There were so many bodies and so much blood in the river, it
looked like the river was bleeding.”
– An 18-year-old Rohingya woman from Buthidaung3
“You could hear screaming. The girls were screaming so loud like
their souls were leaving their bodies.”
– A 65-year-old Rohingya man from Maungdaw4
On August 17, 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed
sanctions on four Burmese5 military and border guard commanders and
2.

Id. at 41.

3.

Id. at 47.

4.

Id. at 35.

5.

Edward Wong, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Myanmar Military over
Rohingya Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.co
m/2018/08/17/us/politics/myanmar-sanctions-rohingya.html [https://per
ma.cc/ZXF4-QL8P]. Although the United States officially uses Burma as
the name of the country, Burma and Myanmar are used interchangeably in
this article to refer to the country. See Lin Yang, Burma or Myanmar: One
Country with Two Names?, VOA (Feb. 4, 2021, 7:27 PM), https://www.
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two military units for their involvement in ethnic cleansing in Burma’s
Rakhine State and other human rights abuses in the country’s Kachin
and Shan States.6 In a press release, the Department noted that
“Burmese security forces have engaged in violent campaigns against
ethnic minority communities across Burma, including ethnic cleansing,
massacres, sexual assault, extrajudicial killings and other serious human
rights abuses.”7 The U.S. State Department responded to the events in
Burma and Bangladesh a month later, when it issued its Documentation
of Atrocities in Northern Rakhine State, noting:
[T]he vast majority of Rohingya refugees experienced or directly
witnessed extreme violence and the destruction of their
homes . . . . The survey reveals that the recent violence in
northern Rakhine State was extreme, large-scale, widespread, and
seemingly geared toward both terrorizing the population and
driving out the Rohingya residents. The scope and scale of the
military’s operations indicate they were well-planned and
coordinated.8

Both announcements were informed by the documentation mission
into abuses suffered by the Rohingya in Myanmar, carried out by the
Public International Law & Policy Group (“PILPG”) from March to
April 2018 with funding and support by the State Department’s Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (“DRL”). PILPG organized
eighteen experienced investigators9 from around the globe to conduct
more than 1,000 interviews in the Rohingya refugee camps in
voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_burma-or-myanmar-one-country-two-na
mes/6201633.html [https://perma.cc/3G36-46NC].
6.

Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Commanders
and Units of Burmese Security Forces for Serious Human Rights Abuses
(Aug. 17, 2018).

7.

Id.

8.

U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, DOCUMENTATION OF ATROCITIES IN NORTHERN
RAKHINE STATE 1–2 (2018). Although this report is dated August 2018, the
State Department’s declaration was not issued until September 24, 2018.
See Ending Genocide: U.S. Government Genocide Determinations and Next
Steps: Hearing Before the U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, 117th
Cong. 3 (2021) (written testimony of Daniel Fullerton).

9.

The investigators were Saadia Aleem, Anonymous, Kristina Filipovich,
Adrienne Fricke, Venitia Govender, Stephen Hathorn, Ralph Keefer, Milica
Kostic, Andrew Mann, Camille McDorman, Stephanie Morin, Pratima T.
Narayan, Gregory P. Noone, Sandra Orlovic, Michael Stefanovic, Larissa
Wakim, Jae Chun Won, and Kyle Wood. PILPG Report, supra note 1, at
i. Neha Bhatia, Debbie Bodkin, Celine Denisot, Sadiyya Haffejee, Stephanie
Munro, and Paul R. Williams were also members of the team on the ground
in Cox’s Bazar at various time during the project. Id.
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Bangladesh over a five-week period.10 With substantial assistance by its
pro bono legal partner Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (“Orrick”),
PILPG attorneys and staff11 coded and analyzed more than 15,000
pages of interview notes to submit a qualitative report to DRL in the
summer of 2018 and compile its own factual findings in an October
2018 report. PILPG, again with the assistance of Orrick and with
contributions from Dentons, LLP, and international legal experts,12
supplemented those findings in December 2018 with a legal analysis,
which concluded there were “reasonable grounds to believe that crimes
against humanity, genocide, and war crimes have been committed
against the Rohingya in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine State and that,
therefore, a criminal investigation is warranted.”13
PILPG presented its factual findings and legal analysis at a press
conference and panel discussion at the National Press Club on
December 3, 2018,14 and followed the American release of the report
with roundtables, seminars, and presentations in Europe in February
2019.15 PILPG also shared its work with the U.S. Holocaust Memorial
Museum and the Independent International Fact Finding Mission on
Myanmar by the U.N. Human Rights Council to assist in their
examinations of the abuses suffered by the Rohingya.16 The
10.

See id. at iii.

11.

PILPG staff who supported the investigation and drafting of the report
included Bridget M. Rutherford, Brett A. Edwards, Margaux Day,
Benjamin Julevier, Neha Bhatia, Sarah Baig, Taylor Shields, Juan Manuel
Chiesa, Dianne Lake, Sarah Libowshy, Stephen Szrom, and Parker White.
Id. at i–ii.

12.

Expert contributors to the PILPG Report were Nina Bang-Jensen, James
C. Johnson, Sandy Hodgkinson, Dr. Gregory P. Noone, William Schabas,
Michael P. Scharf, and Jane Stromseth. Id.

13.

Id. at 53.

14.

Expert Roundtables, PILPG, https://www.publicinternationallawandpolicy
group.org/thought-leadership-initiative-expert-roundtables [https://perma.
cc/9D2E-7L6S].

15.

Upcoming PILPG Europe Events: Documenting Atrocity Crimes
Committed Against the Rohingya & Options for Justice and
Accountability, PILPG, https://www.publicinternationallawandpolicyg
roup.org/pilpg-europe-rohingya-events [https://perma.cc/SJQ5-82R5].

16.

See generally Max Jungreis, ‘Genocide’ Evidence in Case of
Myanmar’s Rohingya Growing, VOA (Dec. 3, 2018, 2:45 PM), https:
//www.voanews.com/a/genocide-evidence-in-case-of-myanmar-rohing
ya-growing/4684928.html [https://perma.cc/Z9YZ-QZA2]. The State
Department and PILPG entered into an agreement indicating who
would own the data collected during the mission and how it could be
shared under certain conditions. See id. Furthermore, PILPG’s data
sharing was in accordance with the interviewees’ informed consent to
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International Criminal Court cited the PILPG Report when it
authorized the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation into the
alleged crimes in November 2019.17 U.S. Senator Edward Markey also
referenced the PILPG analysis in his proposed bill, the Rohingya
Genocide Determination Act of 2021.18
The purpose of the PILPG mission “was to provide an accurate
accounting of the patterns of abuse and atrocity crimes perpetrated
against the Rohingya . . . and to help inform the [U.S.] policy decisions
related to accountability in Myanmar.”19 This article provides an
overview of the 2018 Rohingya Documentation Project, highlighting its
challenges with methodology, interpretation, camp movement, and
analysis, and identifying lessons from that effort.20

share responses with organizations working toward justice and
accountability.
17.

Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of
Myanmar, Case No. ICC-01/19, Authorisation of Investigation, 7–8 (Nov.
14, 2019).

18.

S. 1142, 117th Cong. § 2 (2021).

19.

PILPG Report, supra note 1, at iii.

20.

PILPG was not alone in documenting the plight of the Rohingya. E.g., Off.
of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid
Response Mission to Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh (2017); AMNESTY INT’L, MY
WORLD IS FINISHED”: ROHINGYA TARGETED IN CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
IN MYANMAR (2017); FORTIFY RTS. & U.S. HOLOCAUST MEM’L MUSEUM,
“THEY TRIED TO KILL US ALL”: ATROCITY CRIMES AGAINST ROHINGYA
MUSLIMS IN RAKHINE STATE, MYANMAR (2017); HUM. RTS. WATCH,
MASSACRE BY THE RIVER: BURMESE ARMY CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
TULA TOLI (2017); XCHANGE, THE ROHINGYA SURVEY 2017 (2017). Although
PILPG engaged with many of the organizations involved in other Rohingya
documentation efforts, PILPG’s factual findings and legal analysis were
based solely upon the information gathered during the Rohingya
Documentation Project mission. See PILPG Report, supra note 1 at iii.
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II. History of the Rohingya Crisis21
“F**king Bengali, you have to go to Bangladesh, what you have
here is not yours, it’s ours.” 22
– A non-Rohingya attacker
The Rohingya people are an ethnic Muslim minority group in
Myanmar (a predominantly Buddhist country), settled primarily in the
country’s western coastal Rakhine State.23 They are descendants of
Muslims who have lived in the area (also known as Arakan) for
centuries24 and have actively participated in Burmese politics.25 Many
in Myanmar, however, think of the Rohingya as illegal Bengali
immigrants from the British colonial era26 who pose a national security
21.

Given the complexity of the history of the region, this section is a brief,
admittedly incomplete, review of relevant historical events. There are other
interpretations of the events recounted here. For example, the Myanmar
government disputes many of the facts in this section. See Marlise Simons
& Hannah Beech, Aung San Suu Kyi Defends Myanmar Against
Genocide Accusations, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/12/11/world/asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-rohingya-myanmar-genocid
e-hague.html [https://perma.cc/B8YK-22AG].

22.

PILPG Report, supra note 1, at 32–33 (“When the attackers referred to
the Rohingya, it was almost always racially or ethnically discriminatory
and disparaging.”).

23.

Id. at 5. It is estimated more than one million Rohingya lived in Myanmar
in 2017. Most of that population lived in the north of Rakhine State, a rural
and impoverished area, with three main population centers: Maungdaw,
Buthidaung, and Rathedaung Townships. See generally Myanmar
Rohingya: What You Need to Know About the Crisis, BBC (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561 [https://perma.cc/FH3B
-K26M].

24.

Who Are the Rohingya?, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.aljazeer
a.com/features/2018/4/18/who-are-the-rohingya [https://perma.cc/3MFVDXVP]. See also WARZONE INITIATIVE, ROHINGYA BRIEFING REPORT 3
(2015).

25.

See The 17 Rohingya, Including a Woman, in the Burmese Parliament,
DHAKA TRIB. (Sept. 15, 2017, 1:34 PM), https://archive.dhakatribune.co
m/bangladesh/foreign-affairs/2017/09/15/rohingya-woman-myanmarparliament [https://perma.cc/EFR8-DVVN].

26.

See PILPG Report, supra note 1, at 32–33; Human Rights Watch, Myanmar:
End ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ of Rohingya Muslims, HUM. RTS. WATCH (April 22,
2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/22/burma-end-ethni
c-cleansing-rohingya-muslims [https://perma.cc/J5X5-5XQM]. But see THE
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON RAKHINE STATE, TOWARDS A PEACEFUL, FAIR AND
PROSPEROUS FUTURE FOR THE PEOPLE OF RAKHINE STATE—FINAL REPORT
18 (2017) (stating the size of the Muslim community in the Rakhine State
increased rapidly during the colonial period due to British policies to expand
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threat.27 While early Burmese independence leaders hoped for a unified,
inclusive Burma, successive Burmese governments exacerbated ethnic
and religious tensions after the country’s 1948 independence from Great
Britain.28 For example, the 1948 Union Citizenship Act did not include
the Rohingya as one of the ethnicities that could gain citizenship.29 The
Emergency Immigration Act of 1974 made the Rohingya eligible only
for Foreign Registration Cards, which limited access to jobs and
educational opportunities.30 The 1982 Citizenship Law31 limited
citizenship to members of “national races,” the 135 ethnic groups
deemed to be indigenous to Burma.32 It did not include the Rohingya
and denied them access to any of the law’s three citizenship categories,
effectively making them stateless.33 It also failed to include the
Rohingya language as one of the country’s recognized languages.34 The
“Race and Religious Protection Laws” of 201535 attacked cultural
practices of non-Buddhists like the Rohingya.
A militant group, currently known as the Arakan Rohingya
Salvation Army (“ARSA”), organized in this environment and carried

rice cultivation by bringing Bengali workers into Burma). The Advisory
Commission was established by the Myanmar Government with former U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan as its Chair to examine conditions in the
Rakhine State and propose appropriate responses. Id. at 7–8.
27.

Katie Hunt, How Myanmar’s Buddhists Actually Feel About the Rohingya,
CNN (Sept. 20, 2017, 12:05 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/19/asi
a/myanmar-yangon-rohingya-buddhists/index.html [https://perma.cc/G
8JR-MSM7].

28.

See AL JAZEERA, supra note 24.

29.

Id. The Union Citizenship Act allowed families who had lived in Burma
for at least two generations, like the Rohingya, to apply for identification
cards. These ‘white cards’ did not confer citizenship, however. Id.

30.

See Gregory Poling, Separating Fact from Fiction About Myanmar’s
Rohingya, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Feb. 13, 2014),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/separating-fact-fiction-about-myanmar’srohingya [https://perma.cc/x9EU-VA7K]; AL JAZEERA, supra note 24.

31.

Burma Citizenship Law (Pyithu Hluttaw Law No. 4 of 1982) (1982) (Myan.).

32.

AL JAZEERA, supra note 24.

33.

Id.

34.

JOSEPH LO BIANCO, BUILDING A NATIONAL LANGUAGE POLICY
MYANMAR: A BRIEF PROGRESS REPORT 3 (2016).

35.

See Shameema Rahman & Wendy Zeldin, Burma: Four “Race and Religion
Protection Laws” Adopted, LIBR. OF CONG. (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.
loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2015-09-14/burma-four-race-and-religion
-protection-laws-adopted/ [https://perma.cc/DXP2-2U3B].
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out raids against the Burmese police and border guards.36 Following a
reported October 2016 attack by Rohingya insurgents killing nine police
officers in northern Maungdaw (Rakhine State), there was an escalation
of state violence against the Rohingya.37 International organizations
reported ethnic cleansing and other violence against the Rohingya,
which caused displacement internally within Burma and into
Bangladesh.38 Following an August 25, 2017 ARSA attack on military
outposts, Myanmar security forces launched a series of widespread and
systematic attacks against the Rohingya population in Rakhine State.39
On September 5, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(“UNHCR”) called for “life-saving assistance” as more than 125,000
Rohingya refugees fled to Bangladesh.40 Three days later, the numbers
swelled to 270,000; more than 415,000 refugees arrived by September
19.41
Within a few months, over 700,000 Rohingya had fled their homes
to seek refuge in sprawling and overcrowded refugee camps and
settlements in eastern Bangladesh.42 These Rohingya men, women, and
children fled to escape mass shootings and aerial bombardments, gang

36.

Myanmar: New Evidence Reveals Rohingya Armed Group Massacred
Scores in Rakhine State, AMNESTY INT’L (May 22, 2018, 5:31 PM),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/05/myanmar-new-evide
nce-reveals-rohingya-armed-group-massacred-scores-in-rakhine-state/
[https://perma.cc/TX4X-43PQ].

37.

Myanmar Says Nine Police Officers Killed by Insurgents on Bangladesh
Border, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2016, 10:29 PM), https://www.theguar
dian.com/world/2016/oct/10/myanmar-nine-police-killed-insurgents-ban
gladesh-border (last visited Mar. 2, 2022).

38.

See Eleanor Albert & Lindsay Maizland, The Rohingya Crisis, COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELS. (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohi
ngya-crisis [https://perma.cc/B4PK-CL7N]; Eric Schwartz, The Rohingya
Crisis in Myanmar, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Oct. 20, 2017),
https://www.cfr.org/event/rohingya-crisis-myanmar [https://perma.cc/7L
TL-GMEU].

39.

See Albert & Maizland, supra note 38.

40.

100 Days of Horror and Hope: A Timeline of the Rohingya Crisis, UNHCR
(Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/stories/2017/12/5a1c3
13a4/100-days-horror-hope-timeline-rohingya-crisis.html [https://perma.cc
/LJW3-RK6A].

41.

Id.

42.

Rohingya Refugee Crisis, U.N. OFF. FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFS., https://www.unocha.org/rohingya-refugee-crisis
[https://perma.cc/H3AH-W828].
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rapes and severe beatings, torture and burning, and attacks from
flamethrowers and grenade launchers.43

III. The 2018 Mission
Aware of allegations of serious human rights abuses driving the
large numbers of the Rohingya into refugee camps in southern
Bangladesh, the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka provided a small grant to a
local NGO to collect refugee stories within the camps.44 The Embassy
shared the results with a visiting congressional aide and the State
Department, where support swiftly built for a systematic examination
of the abuses suffered by the Rohingya in Myanmar.45
In late 2017, shortly after the cessation of the major attacks in
northern Rakhine State, DRL reached out to PILPG and other
organizations to determine who would be able to undertake an
investigation of abuses suffered by the Rohingya on short notice. Quick
action was needed because DRL wanted to ensure fresh memory of the
events was captured and produce a report by mid-2018. There was also
a concern on the ground: interviews in the refugee camps needed to be
completed before the beginning of monsoon season (estimated to occur
by the end of April or the beginning of May). It was determined PILPG
was the only organization that could complete the task under those
constraints.46 Throughout the rest of 2017, PILPG worked with DRL
and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(“INR”) to shape the scope of the mission. Principal concerns were
assembling a team of experienced investigators, adapting an existing
43.

PILPG Report, supra note 1, at iv. See also id.; Alyssa Ayers, The
World’s Fastest-Growing Humanitarian Crisis, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELS. (Dec. 4, 2017, 4:30 PM), https://www.cfr.org/blog/worlds-fastestgrowing-humanitarian-crisis [https://perma.cc/YPJ5-XDN8].

44.

Conversations with U.S. Embassy Dhaka officials (March 7, 2018) (notes
on file with authors).

45.

Id.

46.

A component of the mission was the State Department’s desire for an
assessment of how a collection process could be undertaken to establish a
database of missing, disappeared, and presumed dead (“MDPD”) victims
in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Such an assessment would complement any
transitional justice process and support family reunification and notification
in the future. PILPG partnered with Fundación de Antropología Forense
de Guatemala (“FAFG”) to undertake the assessment. A representative of
FAFG participated in the advance team visit to Dhaka and Cox’s Bazar in
March 2018. FAFG then spent nine days in the refugee camps and
resettlement areas around Cox’s Bazar in April and May 2018. This scoping
team conducted 268 interviews with relatives of MDPD victims and
provided an assessment report to the State Department in August 2018.
That significant effort is not covered in this article.
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questionnaire to the Rohingya situation to elicit the information to be
analyzed, adapting the suggested State Department methodology for
collecting the data to the situation among the Rohingya refugees in
Bangladeshi refugee camps to ensure unbiased reporting, and preparing
for logistics of the mission.
This was not the first time the State Department had assembled a
team of investigators to collect data on the perpetration of mass
atrocity crimes.47 In 2004, the State Department turned to the Coalition
for International Justice to conduct a mission to produce a large,
credible sample of data to determine the nature of the crimes occurring
in Darfur in order to inform U.S. policy decisions.48 That team
interviewed Darfuris in refugee camps in Sudan and eastern Chad.49
The results of that mission influenced Secretary of State Colin Powell
to declare in his testimony before the U.S. Senate that the U.S. position
was that genocide had occurred in Darfur.50 A similar mission was
undertaken in South Sudan in 2011 but was cut short due to security
concerns.51 These missions guided the State Department and PILPG in
developing the methodology, updating the questionnaire, and recruiting
experienced investigators.
A. Assembling a Team

In late 2017, PILPG Senior Peace Fellow Nina Bang-Jensen, who
was Executive Director at the Coalition for International Justice at the
time of the Darfur mission, began compiling a list of investigators from
the Darfur and South Sudan missions who might be available for the
47.

U.S. Embassy personnel in many countries collected witness statements
throughout refugee camps in 1992 and 1993 to provide information to the
U.N.’s Commission of Experts on atrocities committed during the conflict
in Yugoslavia. That effort, however, was not conducted by experienced
investigators or structured to provide statistically valid data. See S.R. Res.
780 (Oct. 6, 1992); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780: Investigating
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 5
CRIM. L.F. 279, 290 (1994).

48.

See generally Nina Bang-Jensen & Stefanie Frease, Creating the ADT:
Turning a Good Idea into Reality, in GENOCIDE IN DARFUR: INVESTIGATING
THE ATROCITIES IN THE SUDAN 45 (Samuel Totten & Eric Markusen eds.,
2007).

49.

Id. at 45–46.

50.

The Crisis in Darfur: Hearing Before the Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 108th Cong.
(2004) (statement of Colin L. Powell, Sec’y of State of the United States).
See also Rebecca Hamilton, Inside Colin Powell’s Decision to Declare
Genocide in Darfur, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 17, 2011), https://www.theatlan
tic.com/international/archive/2011/08/inside-colin-powells-decision-to-decl
are-genocide-in-darfur/243560/ [perma.cc/67FS-LZXB].

51.

Source is on file with the authors.
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Rohingya project. PILPG also reached out to its network of prosecutors
and investigators who had worked at international tribunals. Those
who could not participate often recommended other experienced
individuals who might be available. With the dates for the mission not
set and initially needing a commitment of three weeks on the ground,
PILPG’s efforts to secure investigators was a challenge, even with the
assistance of DRL. PILPG was also committed to having geographic
and gender diversity among the investigators. By February 2018,
PILPG, with DRL engagement, had assembled a gender-balanced
investigation team of eighteen highly experienced and trained
international investigators from eleven countries52 to join the mission.
They included investigators from the Darfur and South Sudan missions
and international tribunals, as well as military, security, and Burma
experts, in addition to international criminal accountability experts.
The first group of investigators arrived March 24, 2018 in Dhaka, and
the second group of eight investigators arrived on April 11, 2018.
B. Methodology of Data Collection

The most important step in the mission preparation was designing
the methodology process to guide the investigators in the field. The
goal was to collect first-hand accounts from Rohingya refugees. The
sample had to be large enough, randomly selected, and collected from
multiple refugee camps and settlement areas to be able to draw
conclusions that were statistically objective, credible, neutral,
transparent, and defensible (predictable and repeatable) against claims
of “cherry picking” data or bias. Statisticians within INR developed the
methodology. They decided more than 1,000 interviews would provide
a representative sample if they were collected from a wide cross-section
of the camps.53 INR gave PILPG maps of the camps. PILPG then
worked with INR on how to implement the methodology based on the
maps to ensure proper geographic coverage (i.e., how many camps to
be surveyed, how many interviews in each camp).
The methodology, a hybrid of classical survey and criminal
investigation methods, relied upon (1) using a team of experienced
investigators and trained interpreters to conduct the interviews; (2)
ensuring a random selection of interviewees throughout all of the camps
by using recognized polling methods such as skip pattern and random
birthday choice;54 (3) interviewing only persons above the age of
eighteen; (4) limiting interviews to respondents who had fled Myanmar
52.

Investigators came from the United Kingdom, South Korea, Brazil, South
Africa, Canada, New Zealand, Kenya, South Sudan, Iraq, Serbia, and the
United States. See PILPG Report, supra note 1, at iv, 10.

53.

Id. at 9.

54.

Id. See also infra Section III.G.5.

315

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Vol. 54 (2022)
Responding to Claims of Atrocities Against the Rohingya:
Behind the Scenes of the 2018 Rohingya Documentation Project

since October 2016; (5) collecting only first-hand accounts (not
documenting hearsay); (6) using a standardized interview format and
approach to information gathering; and (7) coding the information from
the interviews according to alleged perpetrator, crime, and location.55
Coding is a process for turning information gathered in a
documentation interview into “codes” that allow for computerized
analysis of the data, enhancing the ability to identify patterns of
activity.56 For example, an interviewee might say she* witnessed her
male* neighbor* being cut* with a knife* by a man* wearing what
appeared to be a uniform with insignia* on a particular date* in a
particular location*. Each of the asterisks indicates an “item” or
“event” that receives a code or designator. These designators can then
be grouped into categories, such as witness/victim, perpetrator,
event/action, location, or date. The notes of each interview have to be
reviewed and coded. The coding then needs to be double-checked before
it is put into a digital platform which allows for numeric analysis of the
data. Aggregating such information can help one discern patterns of
events, activities, perpetrators, location, and timing. PILPG contracted
with Research Control Systems, a subsidiary of D3, to design a
documentation software specifically for this project, which would
aggregate the coded information and ultimately transmit the
information to DRL.
C. Questionnaire

The questionnaire was adapted from the previous Darfur and South
Sudan missions and went through multiple rounds of editing between
PILPG and experts at the State Department. PILPG fine-tuned the
questionnaire to be more responsive to legal definitions of international
humanitarian crimes. The questionnaire consisted of an introduction,
consent script, demographic information, sixteen questions, and nine
places for investigator observations.57
55.

PILPG Report, supra note 1, at 9.

56.

See MATTHEW B. MILES ET AL., QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS: A METHODS
SOURCEBOOK (4th ed. 2019).

57.

Despite efforts to refine the questionnaire, some investigators found it rigid
and constraining. While appreciating the purpose of the mission and the
need for its strict methodology, they were used to interviewing witnesses by
engaging in open-ended discussions and asking follow-up questions, rather
than following a box-ticking script. Nonetheless, all the investigators used
the questionnaire. Additional information obtained during the interviews
was not used in the qualitative analysis of the data but was used and
incorporated in PILPG’s report narrative. The questionnaire was supposed
to be “tested” during the advance team’s time in Cox’s Bazar. That was
not possible due to the travel limitations arising from visa restrictions.
PILPG overcame this challenge by testing the questionnaire during the
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D. Logistics

During this preparatory time, PILPG reached out to the UN and
other organizations actively involved in the refugee camps or who had
conducted previous documentation missions involving the Rohingya,
such as Médecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders, Human
Rights Watch, and Physicians for Human Rights. Universally, they
commented on the need for strong interpreter services. PILPG,
therefore, undertook a major effort to locate qualified interpreters. It
also made security, transportation, fiscal, and lodging arrangements.
E. Getting to the Field

An advance team arrived in Bangladesh in early March 2017 to
evaluate conditions in the camps and lay the groundwork for the arrival
of the investigation teams. Starting in Dhaka, the team met with U.S.
Embassy staff who facilitated meetings with senior Bangladeshi
officials, particularly at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and with
organizations working in the refugee camps. The team met individually
with representatives of the U.S. Agency International Development
(“USAID”), the Canadian High Commission, United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”). The various representatives
asked how PILPG planned to address the problem of revictimization of
witnesses. PILPG stressed it was a concern it took seriously and
explained it hoped to prevent revictimization by using experienced
investigators to conduct the interviews, ensuring the investigators are
made aware of the concern during training, providing psychosocial
counseling and support to investigators and interpreters, and having
information on health and social services within the camps available for
the interviewees. The representatives also noted the lack of trained
interpreters and private space within the camps for conducting the
interviews.
The team then traveled to Cox’s Bazar, the city in south
Bangladesh closest to the camps and settlements, to assess the
operational environment, conduct test interviews with the
interpreters’ training and with a smaller sample than anticipated. PILPG
then updated the questionnaire based on feedback from that testing. See
infra Sections III.F, III.G. Still, issues remained. For example, most
investigators felt sexual violence was underreported during the mission. Yet,
after an interview with a woman in mid-April, the woman told the
investigator in private she had been raped with a group of women. As a
result of this information, the investigator and team’s psychologist
conducted two separate, more detailed group interviews (focus groups).
Nine additional women participated in the group interviews. The
information provided by the women was not included in the quantitative
data or the qualitative analyses in PILPG’s reports since the groups fell
outside the established methodology.
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questionnaire, visit the camps, meet with local officials, and consult
with representatives of UN organizations and international NGOs
operating in the camps. The team was soon joined by PILPG’s logistical
support team who set up operations.58 The Office of the Refugee Relief
and Repatriation Commissioner (“RRRC”), the Bangladeshi
government office that oversaw the camps, hosted a meeting of the
PILPG team and representatives of the State Department with the
Camp Officers in Charge (“CiC”) where PILPG and the State
Department officials explained the mission and answered questions. The
RRRC agreed to facilitate the mission whenever necessary. PILPG
indicated it would keep the RRRC generally informed of the mission’s
progress and undertook to inform the individual CiCs when PILPG
interviewers would be working in their camps of responsibility. Such a
“heads up” permitted the CiCs to minimize interference with the team’s
work by camp personnel; otherwise, there was no interaction between
the team and the CiCs.59 The team also met with the local
representatives of UNHCR and the International Organization for
Migration (“IOM”) who managed the refugee camps and they provided
insights into camp operations and services.
F. Interpretation

From the mission’s inception, through the planning in Washington
and the advance team’s meetings in Dhaka, and while setting up
operations in Cox’s Bazar, everyone PILPG talked to reiterated the
need for high quality interpretation for the mission to succeed.
Unfortunately, finding interpreters in Cox’s Bazar who were well-suited
for the mission proved to be a challenge. First, there was a limited pool
of trained interpreters, with fierce competition for the most capable.60
Because PILPG did not have a continuing presence in the camps, the
58.

Neha Bhatia and Stephanie Munro supported the project by handling
finances, office operations, and logistics. In addition, Ms. Bhatia was the
methodology expert for the project. She monitored the collection of data
to ensure statistical rigor and to maintain the integrity of the project. Ms.
Munro was dedicated to working with the interpreters. She managed their
schedules, arranged transport, and dealt with any conflicts that arose during
the arduous mission. Their contributions were a key element to the
mission’s success.

59.

At the end of the mission, on one of its last days, Bangladesh security
stopped one of the mission’s vans while it was transporting the team over
a misunderstanding. The Project Director was able to resolve the matter
promptly by calling the RRRC Commissioner who secured the team’s
release.

60.

A major complication was the low literacy rate among the Rohingya. It was
estimated almost three quarters of the population (73%) was illiterate in
any language. ANAHI AYALA IACUCCI ET AL., INFORMATION NEEDS
ASSESSMENT: COX’S BAZAR—BANGLADESH 4, 8, 15 (2017).
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interpreters available had to be hired on an ad hoc basis. PILPG also
reached out to the Rohingya diaspora prior to arrival in Bangladesh to
solicit suggestions. It continued to ask the UN and other human rights
organizations for recommendations once the team was in Cox’s Bazar.
Second, the Rohingya spoke a unique language, and there were few nonnative interpreters who spoke the language to communicate clearly with
those in the camps. Furthermore, Rohingya is not written, adding
another level of complexity to the interviews.61
Once in Cox’s Bazar, the PILPG logistics team swung into action,
collecting names of potential interpreters.62 PILPG brought in an
international field interpretation expert with experience with the
International Criminal Court to assess the local candidates and conduct
a two-day training workshop with the collaboration of a sociolinguist
with Translators Without Borders. Thirty-three candidates were
invited. They were trained on fundamental principles of interpreting,
the importance of neutrality, interviewing techniques, terminology,
documentation best practices, note taking, gender dynamics, ethical
dilemmas, and the importance of self-care. An investigator led a session
on working with interpreters from an investigator’s point of view and
previewed the mission and its methodology. At the end of the training,
PILPG engaged the ten best interpreters based on their participation
in the training, level of English, demeanor, and understanding of the
fundamental principles of interpreting. PILPG maintained another list
of substitute interpreters for a call up on an as needed basis. Eventually,
eighteen of the trained interpreters were used.63
G. Overcoming Hurdles

The mission was a success. From April 1 to 22, PILPG’s
investigators conducted interviews with 1,024 Rohingya refugees across
thirty-four camps and settlements in the Cox’s Bazar area, resulting in
61.

The Rohingya speak Rohingya, also called Ruáingga. While the language is
unique in Myanmar, it is similar to Bengali dialects, in particular the
Chittagongian language spoken in and around Cox’s Bazar. Id. at 4–5;
Christine Ro, The Linguistic Innovation Emerging from Rohingya Refugees,
FORBES (Sept. 13, 2019, 11:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/christin
ero/2019/09/13/the-linguistic-innovation-emerging-from-rohingya-refugees/
?sh=4f07517c5e42 (last visited Mar. 2, 2022) (describing the mutual
intelligibility between Rohingya and Chittagongian); Agence France-Presse,
Language of the Rohingya to be Digitised: ‘It Legitimises the Struggle’, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 18, 2017, 11:40 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/worl
d/2017/dec/19/language-rohingya-digitised-legitimises-struggle-emails
[https://perma.cc/T459-FFVX].

62.

See supra note 58.

63.

Two of the interpreters were native Rohingya who were able to assist
other interpreters in understanding differences between Ruáingga and
Bengali dialects. See PILPG Report, supra note 1, at iv.
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more than 15,000 pages of notes with 13,000 coded instances of violence
and violations. This allowed for an analysis of patterns of systemic
abuse. Ultimately, the U.S. Government imposed sanctions on some
senior Myanmar security officials and it recognized that atrocities had
occurred.64 Yet, as with any large-scale project, there were obstacles to
overcome from the outset.
1.

Visas

Securing the appropriate visas for the PILPG team was an
unexpected complication. While the U.S. Embassy and Bangladeshi
officials suggested tourist visas obtained on arrival would be sufficient
for the mission, official Bangladesh policy stressed the need for
international NGO community workers in the refugee camps to secure
NGO worker visas (or researcher, official duty, or business/work visas,
as appropriate). While some humanitarian workers in the camps
operated with tourist visas,65 PILPG, as an international legal NGO,
abided by Bangladesh laws and regulations. The U.S. Embassy and the
State Department assisted PILPG with obtaining the proper visas. At
the embassy’s urging, the Foreign Ministry interceded with the Interior
Ministry, and visas were eventually issued. Still, the three-week delay
caused PILPG to postpone the mission, preventing some investigators
from participating due to scheduling constraints, and limited the
advance team from testing the collection methodology and
questionnaire as thoroughly as planned. PILPG used the time while the
proper visas were being processed to train the investigators on the
questionnaire and methodology as well as review security protocols and
the mission’s purpose.
2.

Work Demands

Once the visa situation was resolved, investigators went into the
camps in teams of two investigators, with each investigator paired with

64.

David Brunnstrom & Lesley Wroughton, U.S. Imposes Sanctions on
Myanmar Military Leaders over Rohingya Abuses, REUTERS (July 16, 2019,
5:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-myanmar/u-s-imposessanctions-on-myanmar-military-leaders-over-rohingya-abuses-idUSKCN1U
B2QM [https://perma.cc/4E83-V9U9].

65.

See Bangladesh Police Free Detained Foreign Aid Workers, REUTERS (Feb.
24, 2018, 7:41 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmarrohingya-bangladesh-ngo/bangladesh-police-free-detained-foreign-aid-work
ers-idUSKCN1G80HY [https://perma.cc/TG6W-Y43E]; Tarek Mahmud &
Adil Sakhawat, 39 Foreign Aid Workers Detained Without Papers Outside
Rohingya Camps, DHAKA TRIB. (Mar. 11, 2018, 2:28 PM), https://archive
.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/law-rights/2018/03/11/crackdown-foreignaid-rohingya [https://perma.cc/R5DC-UTZE].
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an interpreter and local guide.66 Each team had at least one female
member—either a female investigator or interpreter—to ensure gender
sensitivity when female respondents were interviewed. INR had
provided interview targets (number of interviews) per camp. The
PILPG team then gave daily deployment plans to each investigative
team, together with maps of medical and psychosocial referral points in
the area.
The interpreters who lived in Cox’s Bazar were picked up every
morning at a central location and transported to a meeting point at the
camp. The investigators and support team stayed at a hotel closer to
the camps. Nonetheless, it took approximately 45 minutes to an hour
for the investigators and more than an hour for the interpreters to drive
to the camps. When the investigation shifted to the southern camps,
driving time increased by almost one hour each way. The investigators
and interpreters were provided lunch and water. Upon arrival at the
camp, the investigators and interpreters joined up with their camp
guide at the meeting point and then went to their designated areas to
conduct interviews. The plan was to get to the camps around 9:00 AM
and depart (due to curfew) at 4:00 PM. There were regular after-workhours debrief sessions at the hotel, when the investigators were given
their camp assignments for the next day and administrative matters
were discussed. Investigators were also expected to review their
interviews each night and code the information.
The pace was demanding. With the period to collect interviews
shortened due to visa problems, the necessary output for each
interviewer increased.67 In order to achieve the desired 1,000+
interviews, each investigator was expected to conduct five to six
interviews a day. Travel within the camps was challenging, often taking
thirty minutes or more for each team after they had met up with their
camp guide at the meeting point to get to its designated area of
coverage for the day. There was one break day each week, but the
investigators often used that day to catch up on coding.
PILPG had arranged for a psychologist trained in therapeutic care
to spend two weeks with the mission to provide psychosocial support
to the team. The psychologist met with each investigator at least once
and conducted debriefing sessions with two groups of interpreters. She
66.

The camp guide was expected to help the investigator and interpreter move
within the camps as well as keep strangers and the curious from disturbing
the interview once it began. PILPG Report, supra note 1 at 10.

67.

See generally id. The planned five-week collection period for the mission
shrank to only twenty-two days. Because of the visa delay, some
investigators who had planned to participate in the mission had to cancel.
Illness among the investigators and a day of rain also limited time in the
camps for interviewing, resulting in the need to conduct more interviews
in the remaining time.
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also shadowed two special interview sessions for rape victims, working
with the investigator to conduct the sessions and helping the victims
address the trauma they were experiencing during the sessions.
3.

Movement Within the Camps

The size and terrain of the camps was a lingering security concern
for the logistics and leadership teams. The camps were large and
hazardous (steep hills, excessive dust, open latrines, etc.), and there
were limited ways to communicate with investigators once they entered
the camps. Nonetheless, PILPG needed to know which parts of the
camps had been covered by each interviewing team to ensure the
integrity of the survey and to map the next day’s interviewing schedule
and territory. PILPG also needed to know where each individual team
member was throughout the day in case he or she needed to be
extracted in an emergency.68 PILPG learned the UN and NGO groups
working within the camps relied upon radio, irregular mobile phone
service, and Wi-Fi. PILPG needed greater fidelity to ensure everyone’s
safety. It looked into using satellite phones, but they were prohibited
by the government. PILPG examined personal tracking devices, but
ultimately found none suited for the mission’s needs. PILPG considered
adding a security officer for each team, but the security company could
not guarantee enough officers would speak the local language or dialect.
After procuring local SIM cards and data plans, PILPG settled on using
the Find My Friends app69 initially, then switched to the Galileo70
overlay on Google Maps, which proved invaluable in tracking
movements and confirming walk patterns. PILPG supplemented the
technology by hiring a local camp guide for each investigator. The
system worked well, as the technology tracked the investigators’
movements and the guides served as a complementary communication
system for the teams.71
68.

Id. at 9. At the busiest time of the mission, PILPG had seven teams of
investigators scattered throughout the camps; in total, eighteen investigators
conducted interviews in thirty-four refugee camps and settlement areas.

69.

Apple, Find My Friends, https://apps.apple.com/us/app/find-my-friends/
id466122094 [https://perma.cc/JF2Z-K76D].

70.

The Galileo app was renamed Guru Maps in 2019. See Guru Maps:
Formerly Known as “Galileo Offline Maps”, GURU MAPS: OFFLINE MAPS &
NAVIGATION, https://gurumaps.app/ [https://perma.cc/X4SY-7UQ7].

71.

Security was a prime consideration of the mission’s leadership. Each
investigator was briefed on the security situation, proper security protocol,
and reporting requirements prior to arrival. PILPG instituted a “buddy”
system, requiring investigators to accompany one another each time
someone left the hotel compound. The leadership monitored security
notifications among the U.N., the U.S. Embassy, and the international nongovernmental organization community within the camps and sent back
twice daily messages to PILPG management in Washington, D.C.

322

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Vol. 54 (2022)
Responding to Claims of Atrocities Against the Rohingya:
Behind the Scenes of the 2018 Rohingya Documentation Project

4.

Money

The handling of money was problematic. Often, goods and services
in the Cox’s Bazar area, outside of the large hotels, were on a cash-only
basis. PILPG relied upon regular wire transfers through Western
Union. It was not an ideal situation with high security risk, but it
worked, and all funds were accounted for.
5.

Methodology: Beautiful in the Abstract, but Challenging in
Implementation

The methodology was designed to capture a diverse snapshot of the
camps, which would allow the State Department to draw conclusions
about what happened among the population as a whole. A key
component of the methodology was ensuring the randomness of the
sampling. The camps were allocated a certain number of interviews to
be achieved that were proportional to their population size. PILPG
would then assign an investigation team a location in a camp (using
GPS coordinates). At the location, the team would choose a starting
point (such as a mosque, bridge, or food distribution point). The team
would then divide at the starting point, with each investigator going in
opposite directions, turning to the left to prevent overlap by
investigators in the same area. The investigator would use a code to
determine randomly at which household to start. After the initial
household, the investigator would turn to his or her left and choose
every third household (skip pattern). Once at the household, the
investigator and interpreter would seek permission to enter. If
permission was granted, the investigator would seek informed consent
by the household.72 Then, the investigator would ask how many persons
over the age of 18 lived in the household. Using a random birthday
table, the investigator would select the person in the household to
72.

See generally PUB. INT’L L. POL’Y GRP., FIELD GUIDE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY
DOCUMENTATION OF SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (2016). The
PILPG advance team in Cox’s Bazar worked with the State Department,
investigators, and interpreters to develop informed consent and
confirmation to consent language that was understandable and informative.
The informed consent form used by PILPG on the mission read:
Hello, my name is _____ and I work for the Public International
Law & Policy Group (“PILPG”). We are talking with refugees
about their experience in Myanmar. We would like to talk to a
member of your family, from this home, if they are willing. I will be
choosing them at random. Taking part in this survey is voluntary.
Whoever speaks with me can stop the interview at any time and
can refuse to answer any questions they are not comfortable with.
Your family will not receive anything for speaking with me. We
understand you and your family may not want to talk about your
experiences and if so, we respect your decision. Do you have any
questions about what I just told you?
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interview. This randomness ensured no group, such as senior males,
heads of households, or the person with the “best” story, dominated the
sampling. No substitutes of persons were permitted. If the selected
person was not present, the interviewer would leave the household and
continue to the next household in the skip pattern. After selecting the
person to be interviewed, the investigator would conduct the interview,
reconfirm the person’s consent,73 and leave. PILPG had a protocol for
receiving evidence if offered, but collecting evidence was not the
mission’s purpose. Ultimately, very few items of evidence were collected
during the mission.
The methodology, while necessary to ensure the results’ credibility,
was difficult in accommodating the nature and geography of the camps.
The lanes in the camp were short, or turning left might require the
investigator, interpreter, and guide to go up and over hills in hopes of
finding the next household. In addition, it was often confusing to a
household when, after just having given an unknown investigator
permission to enter and engage in an interview, the investigator and
interpreter would have to leave without conducting an interview
because the “random birthday” selected individual was not at home.
They wondered why someone else could not speak, but that would
interfere with the randomness of the survey. Nonetheless, the
experienced interviewers persevered in adhering to the methodology
despite the obstacles to ensure the reliability of the documentation
effort.
6.

Mapping

In order for the State Department to be able to analyze the data
received properly and to determine where events happened, it was
important for the interviewees to identify where they were from and
where the events they experienced or witnessed occurred. This was
difficult because many of the interviewees were illiterate, so they could
not spell or identify a location’s name. Also, locations had different
names in Burmese and Ruáingga. Furthermore, many of them had
never traveled far from their villages. This complicated the
investigators’ work, often frustrating them because being precise with
a location was important for the mission, but obtaining it took up a lot
of time during an interview. The teams found the map atlas (which
73.

The confirmation of consent script read:
Before I leave, I’d like to reconfirm how we will be using your
information and that you are comfortable with providing this
information. Your responses will be shared in a report to help
improve international understanding about the issues affecting your
community. If you no longer wish to share your story, please let me
know.
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broke northern Rakhine State into a grid covering areas identified in
open sources, provided by the State Department) unwieldy which
limited its use—in addition, many of the interviewees could not read a
map. Investigators and interpreters resorted to having the interviewees
identify locations phonetically or having the interviewees describe
locations in relation to fixed points (like a river, or big town). When
PILPG obtained the UN naming convention for Rakhine State locations
in both languages (Burmese and Ruáingga), the task became easier.
Using the State Department map atlas with grids, the UN list, input
from the interpreters, and discussions among the investigators
themselves, the investigators were able to identify most locations. State
Department analysts were eventually able to locate approximately nine
out of every ten locations identified by the investigators and conducted
geospatial analysis based on the overall grid.
7.

Coding and Analysis

Using the State Department-designed questionnaire, the
investigators were expected to perform a qualitative analysis on the
data collected in each interview. At the end of each day, the
investigator was to note manually onto a coding sheet attached to each
questionnaire information on (1) whether the interviewee was a victim
or a witness of a purported violation; (2) the violation or “event”
documented; (3) the perpetrators’ unit or ethnic identity and weapons
used;74 (4) the date of the violation; (5) the number of victims of the
reported “event”; and (6) the location of the violation or event. The
codes for events and perpetrators had been determined in advance,
although they were expanded during the mission. Eventually, there
were 60 “event” codes and 21 “perpetrator” codes, and more than
13,000 documented incidents of abuse or grave violations.75 The results
were then supposed to be entered daily onto a secure, specially designed
documentation software, with the data later transmitted to the State
Department. It quickly became apparent this would not be able to be
done on a real time basis, despite the best efforts of the investigators
and PILPG logistics and leadership teams (the mission had initially
included extra time for coding activities, but the delay in starting the
mission due to the visa problems eliminated that time). DRL and
PILPG decided the investigators would instead fill out the coding
74.

DOCUMENTATION OF ATROCITIES IN NORTHERN RAKHINE STATE, supra note
8, at 19 (“The presence of ARSA in the refugee camps likely gave pause to
some refugees who might otherwise identify ARSA as perpetrators. ARSA’s
involvement in the violence thus is likely under-reported. However, based
on other credible research into the attacks in northern Rakhine State, we
have no reason to conclude the group was responsible for more than a small
fraction of the violence.”).

75.

PILPG Report, supra note 1, at iii.
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sheets manually and attach them to the individual questionnaires. The
hard copies of the questionnaires with the coding sheets would be
returned to the U.S. after the mission (with chain of custody tracking).
Then the PILPG team in the United States would go through them to
input the coded data into the database, which provided an opportunity
to double check the coding.
Upon conclusion of the mission and return of the questionnaires to
PILPG offices in Washington, D.C., PILPG began processing the
documents. It soon reached out to its pro bono partner Orrick to help
with digitally scanning and securely storing digital copies of the
questionnaire. This enabled a larger team of reviewers to access the
documents. Ultimately, Orrick provided 90 lawyers to assist the dozens
of PILPG staff members with the coding and analyzing of the
questionnaires and inputting the data.76

IV. Writing the Report
“In sum, there are too many coincidences in the nature and
similarity of the attacks across the mapped area of Rakhine to suggest
anything other than a carefully planned military operation designed to
terrorize the refugees into leaving their homeland.” 77
– PILPG Report
The writing of both the factual findings and legal analysis was an
evolutionary process because neither was originally planned. PILPG
was to provide a qualitative factual report to DRL for the State
Department, which it could use to do its own analysis and reach its
policy recommendations. To prepare its report to the State
Department, a team of PILPG lawyers reviewed the reports each
investigator completed at the end of their time in Bangladesh. PILPG
quickly identified key themes and patterns from the investigators’
reports: (1) pre-attack pattern of violence and human rights abuses
targeting the Rohingya over many years; (2) patterns of escalating
violence throughout 2016 and 2017; and (3) violence and violations
beginning in August 2017, which signified the security forces’ assault
that prompted the massive Rohingya refugee flows into Bangladesh,
referred to by many interviewees as “massacre day.” PILPG then
applied the stories from the Rohingya refugees to information already

76.

Orrick also provided its own qualitative and legal analysis of the data.
The mission’s data transmission to the State Department and PILPG’s
findings and analysis would have been significantly delayed without the
substantial commitment by Orrick to this endeavor.

77.

PILPG Report, supra note 1, at 50.
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documented about the military to put together a draft.78 This drafting
process exposed a greater number of clear patterns of violence than
PILPG or DRL initially expected. Because of this, DRL granted PILPG
permission to produce its own public report that included a legal
analysis.79 PILPG’s public factual findings were similar to the PILPG
qualitative report submitted to DRL. PILPG brought in a larger team,
along with an expert consultation group, to assist with the legal
analysis.
To complete the legal analysis, PILPG’s drafters consulted with a
group of international human rights lawyers. PILPG designated a
drafter for each section (crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes)
with other team members and expert consultants working across all
three sections. For three months, the team worked to uncover patterns
and make connections that matched the elements of each crime, calling
into question one another’s arguments and inferences. One of the
challenges was to discern the requisite intent to determine whether
genocide occurred. PILPG ultimately determined there were

78.

PILPG also hired an expert on the Burmese army to examine the Burmese
military structure, chain of command authority, and insignia of different
military groups. He also reviewed the data collected utilizing his analysis
to identify potential units and perpetrators as described by the
interviewees. The military analysis was provided separate from the
PILPG qualitative analysis provide to the State Department. Source is
on file with the authors.

79.

The PILPG report was split into two: a factual finding and a legal
analysis. The finding was released in early October to complement the
State Department Rohingya documentation report released in late
September 2018. See DOCUMENTATION OF ATROCITIES IN NORTHERN
RAKHINE STATE, supra note 8. It was followed by a detailed legal analysis
released in December. See PILPG Report, supra note 1.
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“reasonable grounds to believe”80 crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and genocide had been committed against the Rohingya.81

V. Conclusion
The 2018 Rohingya Mission was a special type of documentation
mission. At the behest of the State Department, PILPG brought
together international investigators for a short period of time to
conduct a data collection mission looking at alleged atrocities occurring
in a particular location (Myanmar’s Rakhine State) over a set period
(October 2016 to March 2018). Because of its methodology, the State
Department and international legal experts could draw statistically
valid conclusions about the violence the Rohingya had suffered. Most
documentation efforts are more modest and localized, usually
conducted by civil society organizations in the same country where the
atrocities occur. Nonetheless, there are valuable lessons to be drawn
from the Rohingya Documentation Project that can be applied to other
human rights documentation missions. Many of them seem obvious, but
they bear repeating.
• Understand the purpose of the documentation effort. There are
many reasons for documentation: transitional justice for
accountability purposes, truth seeking, institutional reform,
education and awareness-raising, and sharing of stories for closure
and healing.82 Some of these reasons may be able to be pursued
jointly during a mission, but keeping the purpose of the
documentation at the forefront of the mission will help ensure its
80.

See PILPG Report, supra note 1, at vii. There are a range of standards
that can be applied throughout international criminal proceedings, but the
“reasonable grounds to believe” standard is applied by the International
Criminal Court when deciding whether to open an investigation into alleged
crimes. See, e.g., Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on
the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the People’s
Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Case No.
ICC/-01/09, ¶¶ 92, 110 (Nov. 14, 2019) (finding a “reasonable basis” to
believe that crimes against humanity were committed and authorizing an
investigation thereof). See also Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Fact-Finding Mission
on Myan., Hum. Rts. Council, Thirty-Ninth Session, Sept. 10–28, 2018, ¶
83 (finding “reasonable grounds to conclude that serious crimes under
international law have been committed that warrant criminal investigation
and prosecution” in Myanmar); STEPHEN WILKINSON, STANDARDS OF
PROOF IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS FACTFINDING AND INQUIRY MISSIONS 9 (2014).

81.

See generally PILPG Report, supra note 1.

82.

See, e.g., INT’L COAL. OF SITES OF CONSCIENCE, www.sitesofconscience.org
[https://perma.cc/D2SN-7QDB]; HERSTORIES, www.herstories.org [https://
perma.cc/M5K8-VTVR].
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focus and success. It is essential to communicate the purpose of
the mission to the interviewee. Otherwise, it is impossible to
secure informed consent to the interview.
A clear purpose will influence how the entire mission will be
carried out. The PILPG mission did not track down leads it
received of possible perpetrators, which often frustrated the
investigators. That was not the purpose of the documentation
mission. To have done so would have disrupted the methodology
and potentially jeopardized the integrity of the statistical
conclusions.
• Do not underestimate the value of advance planning. Some
missions by necessity must be put together in a hurry, and there
will always be changes once the team is in the field (see below—
Be flexible). Nonetheless, spending time before the mission to sort
through logistics, consider options, ponder possible problems, and
develop contingencies will give mission leadership the ability to
be nimble once it faces challenges in the field.
• Be flexible. Even the best laid plans are likely to change on a
mission, especially because most documentation work occurs
under difficult conditions. It is not just the mission leadership
who must be flexible, but individual team members must also
adapt. Despite substantial effort to sort out camp
communications before arriving in Cox’s Bazar, PILPG went
through several tracking options (satellite phones, SIM cards,
personal trackers, additional security guards) once the team was
on the ground. Finally, the team decided upon the Galileo App,
which was suggested by one of the investigators. Additionally,
when one of the investigators was presented with an unexpected
opportunity to work on focus groups dealing with allegations of
rape, the other investigator on her team agreed to conduct more
interviews to free her up. This allowed the mission to achieve its
numeric interview goals. Being flexible allows you to support your
team.
• Support your team. There are several aspects of team support. (1)
Provide clear direction. The PILPG mission had a strong Project
Director who was able to give the investigators the clear guidance
they needed to do their jobs, while managing the logistical
demands in Washington. (2) Take care of details. The logistics
team made sure the investigators had the materials they needed
to get the job done. They arranged lodging, transport, and
security so the investigators could concentrate on the difficult
task at hand. Mission leadership also arranged for group meals
away from the camps and hotel to build camaraderie. (3) Train,
train, train. Ensure members of the team receive the necessary
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training to do the mission properly. Even with experienced
investigators, like the ones on this mission, PILPG trained them
in the methodology, coding, random selection methods (the
birthday table and skip pattern), the questionnaire, and informed
consent. In addition, PILPG brought in an interpretation expert
to train the interpreter candidates to make sure they understood
the basic elements of interpreting. It takes time and resources,
but investing in training will help everyone do the work at the
same standard, ensuring consistency of result. (4) Look after the
entire team. The PILPG mission achieved what it did because
the investigators and interpreters worked cohesively. Making sure
the interpreters knew the purpose of the mission and importance
of the methodology made them feel part of the entire effort. In
addition, the logistics staff arranged secure transportation for the
interpreters as well as provided lunches and water. PILPG also
ensured they had access to the psychologist for support during
the mission.
• Do not ignore psychosocial support. This is crucial.
Documentation work is exhausting—both physically and
mentally—especially when dealing with atrocities in challenging
environments. Even for experienced investigators, the work takes
a heavy toll on the people asking questions and the interpreters
serving to engage the interviewees. Few people are prepared to
listen to stories of horror all day long. It is important they have
the opportunity to address personal issues that come up during
and after a mission. By providing clear direction and taking care
of details, you help build a resilient team able to respond to
inevitable challenges and work together to achieve the mission’s
goals.
• Do not ignore technology. Technology can be a great help for any
mission, and it is important to assess possible technology tools
during the planning period. For example, PILPG, as it planned
for the mission and heard of the difficulty in obtaining trained
translators, considered using apps to assist with translation. The
interviewer would tape the interview and then run the tape
through translation apps. It would save time and, perhaps, ensure
greater fidelity in translation. PILPG decided not to go with that
approach since it would have required additional equipment (tape
recorders) and intrusion upon the interviewee (would the person
consent to having his or her statement recorded?). That approach
would have also raised the issue of storage and chain of custody
of the recordings. Nonetheless, PILPG considered technology
options to address the challenges confronting the mission.
Ultimately, the Rohingya mission was a hybrid of low technology
(paper questionnaires) and more advanced technology (the
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Galileo app). Not every documentation effort will be able to
utilize smart phones and laptops, but even “low tech” missions
are increasingly turning to computerized coding to analyze data
and digitize files for security purposes. New software and
applications can be immensely useful for such efforts.83
• Be sure to know the end use of the data. PILPG and the State
Department had an agreement on data “ownership” and sharing
arrangements. From the outset, it is important to determine who
controls the information and physical documentation material.
Documenters should also consider what happens to the data once
the project ends: Where does it go? Who “owns” it? Who has
access to it? How will it be stored? What is the impact of personal
privacy rules on the use of the information? If possible, it is best
to think through these issues at the beginning of a mission rather
than the end.
Finally, it is important for victims and witnesses to be
heard and have their say. To obtain true informed consent,
they need to know how the information (or data for technology
purposes) will be used. This is an essential part of the trust
building between the investigator and the interviewee.

This is not the end to the story of the Rohingya.84 The State
Department has funded another documentation project among the
Rohingya through the Global Initiative for Justice, Truth and

83.

PILPG and its partners have identified gaps in applicability to expediting
or simplifying transitional justice processes as part of an ongoing project
to develop a new documentation solution. There are challenges on both
the documenters/civil society organization side and developers’ side to
develop, establish, maintain accessible, and secure technology systems
supportive of transitional justice. See PUB. INT’L L. POL’Y GRP. ET AL.,
HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTATION BY CIVIL SOCIETY: TECHNOLOGICAL
NEEDS, CHALLENGES & WORKFLOWS (2020).

84.

As this article goes to print, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced
on March 21, 2022 the U.S. Government had concluded “members of the
Burmese military committed genocide and crimes against humanity
against Rohingya.” Antony J. Blinken, U.S. Sec’y of State, Genocide and
Crimes Against Humanity in Burma, Address at the Holocaust Memorial
Museum in Washington, D.C. (Mar. 21, 2022), https://www.state.gov/s
ecretary-antony-j-blinken-at-the-united-states-holocaust-memorial-museu
m/ [https://perma.cc/Q3D3-7RWS]. The finding was based on a review
of multiple reports and analysis and included the Department’s own
“rigorous fact finding.” Id. Secretary Blinken said the findings in the
Department’s 2018 report, see DOCUMENTATION OF ATROCITIES IN
NORTHERN RAKHINE STATE, supra note 8, which were based on the
Rohingya Documentation Project conducted by PILPG, were a “key part”
in arriving at his determination. Id.
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Reconciliation.85 This project started in January 2019 and aims to train
and mentor the Rohingya community to document and share their
stories about the violence and human rights violations they endured in
Myanmar.86 PILPG is proud to participate in that effort.

85.

See Our Work, GLOB. INITIATIVE FOR JUST., TRUTH & RECONCILIATION,
https://gijtr.org/our-work/ [https://perma.cc/G5SV-2R76].

86.

Documenting Human Rights Violations with Rohingya Communities,
INT’L COAL. OF SITES OF CONSCIENCE (2019), https://www.sitesofconsci
ence.org/en/2019/12/documenting-human-rights-violations-with-rohingy
a-communities/ [https://perma.cc/AN26-NCCQ].
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